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I. INTRODUCTION: HAUNTING THE HUNTERS
Examples exist throughout history of individuals who pursued
their ideals actively, even when their behavior violated certain laws or
policies they believed unjust.' Students conducted sit-ins to protest
American involvement in the Vietnam War.2 Martin Luther King,
Jr. marched in the streets to protest treatment of black Americans.3
Environmental activists opposing logging old-growth trees blocked
loggers' access to the forests.' Gregory Lee Johnson burned an
American flag to protest the policies of the Reagan Administration
and of several United States corporations.5 More recently, Francelle
Dorman, a part-time waitress in Niantic, Connecticut, approached
1. Protest and civil disobedience have taken place for at least 2,400 years. G.
WOODSTOCK, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 3 (1966). Recent incidents of international protest and
their subsequent suppression include Chinese students' democratic protest against Communist
oppression in Tiananmen Square, which resulted in the massacre of the protesters. See Chinese
Execute 3 in Public Display for Protest Role, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1989, at 1, col. 5; Doerner,
The Face of Repression, TIME, July 3, 1989, at 27. Iran called for the execution of author
Salman Rushdie, solely because of the perceived offensiveness of his novel, The Satanic Verses.
See Smith, The New Satans, TIME, Mar. 6, 1989, at 36-38. In these instances, neither China
nor Iran exhibited any regard for the freedom of speech that is the cornerstone of our society.
2. See L. FEUER, THE CONFLICT OF GENERATIONS: THE CHARACTER AND
SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDENT MOVEMENTS (1969); PROTEST! STUDENT ACTIVISM IN
AMERICA (J. Foster & D. Long eds. 1969).
3. See B. TAYLOR, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-1963
(1988).
4. State v. Hund, 76 Or. App. 89, 708 P.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1985), rev. denied, 300 Or. 477
(1986); see also State v. Heath, 75 Or. App. 425, 706 P.2d 598 (Ct. App. 1985).
5. Texas v. Johnson, 409 U.S. 397 (1989).
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several armed hunters and asked them not to kill wildlife. 6
Ms. Dorman's brief words with the hunters subjected her to
arrest under section 53a-183a of the Connecticut Penal Code (the
"Connecticut Act").7 The Connecticut Act declares that no person
shall "interfere" or "harass" another person engaged in the lawful
taking of wildlife or "acts in preparation" thereof.8  Hunter harass-
ment laws like the Connecticut Act represent the latest effort to
squelch a growing animal rights movement9 that has stopped cos-
metic companies from testing their products on animals10 and per-
6. Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183a (West 1990).
8. Id.
9. See Allen, The Rights of Nonhuman Animals and World Public Order A Global
Assessment, 28 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 377, 378 (1983); Goodkin, The Evolution of Animal
Rights, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 259 (1987); see also P. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION
(1990) (articulating a comprehensive philosophy embracing the rights of animals).
Compared with the plight of animals in experimentation and factory farming, blood
sports arguably might seem less cruel because they do not involve as many "victims," and the
animals' suffering usually does not last as long as in the other forms of abuse. See Dukes, The
Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act: Will It Ensure that the Policy of the Animal
Welfare Act Becomes a Reality?, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 519 (1987); Hoch, Business Ethics, Law,
and the Corporate Use of Laboratory Animals, 21 AKRON L. REV. 201 (1987); Masonis, The
Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act and the Proposed Regulations: A Glimmer of
Hope in the Battle Against Abusive Animal Research, 16 ENVTL. AFF. 149 (1988); McDonald,
Creating a Private Cause of Action Against Abusive Animal Research, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 399
(1986); Subar, Out from Under the Microscope: A Case for Laboratory Animal Rights, 2 DET.
C.L. REV. 511 (1987); see also Frank, Factory Farming: An Imminent Clash Between Animal
Rights Activists and Agribusiness, 7 ENVTL. AFF. 423 (1979); McCarthy & Bennett, Statutory
Protection for Farm Animals, 3 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 229 (1986); Wise, Of Farm Animals and
Justice, 3 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1986). See generally J. MASON & P. SINGER, ANIMAL
FACTORIES (1980) (documenting the history of government policy and corporate profiteering
involving the farming industry in this country and the disastrous effect of these forces on the
treatment of farm animals).
Nevertheless, the anti-hunting movement attracts thousands of activists and other
sympathizers like Francelle Dorman. Priscilla Feral, president of the Connecticut-based
Friends of Animals, a multi-issue animal rights organization, explained: "We are fighting a
war against the perverse minds who seek to maim and murder sentient animals in their
homes-the parks and public lands that belong to all of us. We believe it is our right, nay, our
duty, to protect all animals." Peterson, For Animal Rights Groups, Hunters Become the
Hunted, Detroit News, Dec. 3, 1989, at 3A, col. 1, 12A, col. 1.
The proliferation of organizations formed solely or primarily for coordinating anti-
hunting activities shows the momentum that the anti-hunting movement has gained. Among
these organizations are Animal Rights Front, New Haven, Connecticut; Committee to Abolish
Sport Hunting ("CASH"), White Plains, New York; Fund for Animals, New York, New
York; Hunt Saboteurs, Anaheim, California; and abroad, Hunt Saboteurs Ass'n, Kent, United
Kingdom.
10. See White, Confronting Animal Rights Activism, L.A. Times, Dec. 3, 1989, at DI, col.
I (discussing animal rights advocates' major victories against cosmetic industry giants,
including Avon, Revlon, and Christian Dior, all of which have stopped testing the safety of
their new products on live animals); Feder, Beyond White Rats and Rabbits, N.Y. Times, Feb.
PROTESTS AGAINST HUNTING
suaded people not to buy fur coats."I A relatively small portion of our
population' 2-those who hunt nonhuman animals-has had remark-
able success in persuading a majority of state legislatures to enact
"hunter harassment statutes.' 3 Although the text of these statutes
varies somewhat from state to state, their thrust is the same: to out-
law the legitimate protests of those who seek to protect animals from
hunters. 1'
Police arrested Ms. Dorman on January 30, 1986, for violating
28, 1988, sec. 3, at 1, col. 1 (describing new techniques in product testing that companies are
exploring and using in place of testing on animals).
11. See La Ganga, Furriers: Protests Have Hurt Salesfor Some Retailers, L.A. Times, Dec.
3, 1989, at Dl, col. 1; McCombs, Fur Guilt: Trapped Between Luxury and That Uneasy
Feeling, Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 1989, at BI, col. 1; Hochswender, As Image of Furs Suffers, So
Do Revenues, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1989, at Al, col. 2.
12. Almost 16 million Americans-approximately 7% of the population-purchased
hunting licenses in 1989. Satchell, The American Hunter Under Fire, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Feb. 5, 1990, at 30.
13. These statutes commonly are referred to as "hunter harassment statutes." See B.
Conner, Hunter Harassment: Plaguing Our American Heritage, OUTDOOR LIFE, Oct. 1990, at
83; E. Wolfson, Saboteurs Thwart Bighorn Sheep Hunters, E MAG., Mar./Apr. 1991, at 43.
Many states have passed "hunter harassment" laws. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-
316 (1989); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2009 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-6-116.5
(1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183a (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 731
(Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. § 372.705 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1201 to 45-1203 (1986);
IDAHO CODE § 36-1510 (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 61, 301-304 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1987); IND. CODE § 14-2-11-2 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-1014 (1989); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 150.7 10 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:648.1 to .3 (West
1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 7541-7542 (Supp. 1987); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 10-422 (Supp. 1987); MICH. STAT. § 300.262 (1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97A.037 (West
1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 578.152 (Vernon 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-3-141 to -144
(1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 503.015 (1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207:57 (1989); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0110 (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-295
(1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-31 (Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29 § 5-212 (West
1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 496.994 (1987); 34 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2162 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 20-13-16 (Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 41-1-8 to -10 (1989); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 70-4-301 to -303 (1989); TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 62.0125 (Vernon Supp.
1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-20-29 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 4708 (1989);
WASH. REV. CODE § 77.16.340 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 20-2-2a (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 29.223 (West 1989).
14. Most of the hunter harassment laws are based on model legislation drafted by the
Wildlife Legislation Fund of America, a pro-hunting lobby based in Washington, D.C. Glass,
Protect Hunters from Harassment, USA Today, Aug. 6, 1990, at All, col. 1. Jim Glass,
president of the pro-hunting group, wrote:
Hunting is perfectly legal in the U.S.A. Harassing hunters is not. It's pretty
simple .... Virtually all of the protection laws are based on model legislation
developed by The Wildlife Legislative Fund of America. The legislation was
drafted with the intention of preventing harassment, while fully recognizing first
amendment rights. There's a time and place for animal rightists to attempt to
effect societal change. The woods, during hunting season, is neither.
Id. at A11. col. 2.
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the Connecticut Act."5 The Connecticut legislature had enacted the
statute in 1985 in response to lobbying efforts by the Sportsman's Alli-
ance, a hunters' interest group. 16 The Connecticut statute imposes
criminal penalties-$500 or up to 90 days in jail-for "interfering"
with or "harassing" anyone "engaged in the lawful taking of wildlife
or acts in preparation for such taking."17 Although Dorman did not
make any physical contact whatsoever with the hunters, they accused
her of harassing them by distracting them from going about their
killing. 18
Prosecutors dropped charges against Ms. Dorman on April 3,
1986, stating only that she had been arrested "prematurely."' 9
Because the dismissal left the constitutionality of the statute
unresolved, Ms. Dorman filed a declaratory action in the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut, which declared
the Connecticut Act unconstitutional. 20 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in Dorman v. Satti,2I an opin-
ion validating the first amendment rights of anti-hunting activists.
Dorman thus established an important proposition: hunter harass-
ment statutes are not content-neutral restrictions on conduct.22
Rather, they are impermissible attempts to regulate the expression
only of those opposed to hunting.2 a In spite of this ruling, however,
statutes like the Connecticut Act remain in effect in a majority of the
states.24
This Comment argues that hunter harassment statutes violate
anti-hunting protesters' first amendment right to speak out against
hunting. Section II begins by introducing the anti-hunting movement
and its strategies. It also presents the hunters' side of the hunting
debate, and their response to anti-hunting protests. Section III exam-
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183a (West 1990). The text of the statute reads:
(a) No person shall: (1) Interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife by
another person, or acts in preparation, or acts in preparation for such taking,
with intent to prevent such taking; or (2) harass another person who is engaged
in the lawful taking of wildlife or acts in preparation for such taking.
(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a
class C misdemeanor.
16. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
17. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-183a, 53a-28, 53a-36(3) (West 1990).
18. Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375, 378 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 383.
21. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
22. Id. at 437.
23. Id.
24. See supra note 13.
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ines the constitutionality of hunter harassment statutes, hunters' most
recent attempt to silence anti-hunting protesters. Section III uses the
Connecticut Act and the Second Circuit's decision in Dorman v. Satti
to illustrate how hunter harassment statutes violate anti-hunting
activists' first amendment right to freedom of speech. First amend-
ment precedent on content-based regulations, content-neutral time,
place, and manner restrictions, and doctrines of overbreadth and
vagueness illustrate the constitutional infirmity of the Connecticut
Act and similar hunter harassment statutes. Section IV concludes
that restrictions on the hunting debate contradict the fundamental
societal value of open and robust exchange of ideas. Section IV urges
the United States Supreme Court to pronounce hunter harassment
statutes unconstitutional upon its next opportunity,
II. THE HUNTING DEBATE
A. The Strategies and Impact of Anti-Hunting Protesters
Hunters kill approximately 200 million animals per year.2"
Hunters also leave behind many wounded and crippled animals.26
Natural predators keep their prey strong by killing only the weakest
members; hunters seek out and destroy the strongest and most fit.
2 7
25. Hunters' 200 million annual victims include deer, bears, moose, rabbits, ducks, geese,
squirrels, and other wildlife, as well as dogs, cats, cows, occasional hikers, and a few fellow
hunters. Satchell, supra note 12, at 30, 33.
26. For every animal a hunter kills and recovers, estimates show that at least two wounded
animals die slowly and painfully from blood loss, infection, or starvation; those who do not die
often suffer from disabling injuries. I. NEWKIRK, SAVE THE ANIMALS! 94 (1990).
27. Natural predators of the species that the hunters themselves wish to kill are often
killed through either the annual massacre called "game management" or the $30 million tax-
funded "predator control" program. Millions of animals-both target and non-target-are
killed each year via federally subsidized hunting activities and other programs necessary to
maintain hunting. I. NEWKIRK, supra note 26, at 95.
A leading animal-rights philosopher criticizes the government's role in the maintenance of
this "sport":
A . . . reply may be given to those hunters and controllers of what are
misleadingly called "wildlife refuges" who claim that to prevent overpopulation
by deer, seals, or whatever the animal in question may be, hunters must
periodically be allowed to "harvest" the excess population-this allegedly being
in the interests of the animals themselves. The use of the term "harvest"--often
found in the publications of the hunter's organizations-gives the lie to the claim
that this slaughter is motivated by concern for the animals. The term indicates
that the hunter thinks of deer or seals as if they were corn or coal, objects of
interest only in so far as they serve human interests. This attitude, which is
shared to a large extent by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, overlooks the vital
fact that deer and other hunted animals are capable of feeling pleasure and pain.
They are therefore not means to our ends, but beings with interests of their own.
If it is true that in special circumstances their population grows to such an extent
that they damage their own environment and the prospects of their own survival,
1991] 1113
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Increasing numbers of activists protest hunting.28 They believe that
hunting is cruel to animals, bad for the ecosystem, and morally
wrong.29
Anti-hunting activists protest by direct action in the field, covert
or overt, to save animals from hunters.3 ° They encourage neighbors,
or that of other animals who share their habitat, then it may be right for humans
to take some supervisory action; but obviously if we consider the interests of the
animals, this action will not be to let hunters kill some animals, inevitably
wounding others in the process, but rather to reduce the fertility of the
animals .... The trouble is that the authorities responsible for wildlife have a
"harvest" mentality, and are not interested in finding techniques of population
control which would reduce the number of animals to be "harvested" by hunters.
P. SINGER, supra note 9, at 234.
28. Hunting protests are not confined to the United States. In 1964, the Hunt Saboteurs
Association was formed in England and has since attracted animal rights activists, offering
them a direct, albeit non-violent, approach towards eliminating animal suffering. P.
WINDEATT, 'They Clearly Now See the Link: Militant Voices, in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS
185 (Singer ed. 1985). With the growth of the animal rights movement in the last few years,
the Hunt Saboteurs' membership has increased. As of 1986, the Hunt Saboteurs Association
had a membership of 5,000 established local groups and a working relationship with the larger
League Against Cruel Sports, which has led the parliamentary campaign to outlaw hunting
with hounds. Id. Although they are not in the headlines as much as they were in the early to
mid-1970's because their activities have become much more accepted in the media's eyes, they
remain out in the field throughout the foxhunting season. Id. Lin Murray, an active member
of the Hunt Saboteurs Association, stated in an interview with Peter Singer:
There's been a really big upsurge of people who want to go out lately. It used to
be the same old people, but loads of new people are coming in. There are three
new groups in London alone, and a couple of new groups in Essex, which is my
area.... In Essex we are sabotaging up to four hunts a week, with groups going
out mid-week.
Id. Thus, the strategies of anti-hunting activists, both in the United States and abroad, vary
widely, with different degrees of success. The activists' direct protests in the fields and the
statutes prohibiting them from doing so, however, constitute the most dramatic confrontations
of the debate and implicate fundamental first amendment principles.
29. Furthermore, anti-hunting activists also contend that hunting-particularly bow
hunting-is cruel, where as many as half the animals shot are not recovered and die slowly
over several days. See Pascelle, Bow Hunting: A Most Primitive Sport, ANIMALS' AGENDA,
May 1990, at 15-18.
30. See C. COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TACTICS, AND THE LAW 52
(1971) (discussing the distinctions between direct and indirect action as it relates to incidents
of civil disobedience). One anti-hunting activist, himself an ex-hunter, recommends an
effective method of direct protest against hunting:
Buy a hunting license, shotgun, shells and a blaze orange hunting cap and vest.
Take the hunter-safety course. Select a hunting area and organize from three to
a hundred people or more ... all licensed hunt saboteurs! Map out a strategy
and routes to cover as much acreage as possible. Be sure that shotguns are well-
oiled and that the group has walkie-talkies, binoculars and compasses. Walk
through the woods occasionally firing into dirt banks. The noise and the aroma
of the gunpowder and oil will cause wildlife to be wary and hole up. This will
reduce the number of animals killed by hunters. Also, grab up hunting permits
offered in lotteries.
Dommer, The Anatomy of Hunt Sabotage, ANIMALS' VOICE MAG., Aug. 1990, at 70.
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especially farmers and ranchers who own large tracts of land, to post
"No Hunting" signs every one hundred yards.3 ' Some activists apply
for hunting licenses themselves, a2 or register nursing home residents
for free senior-citizen hunting licenses, 3 in order to reduce the limited
number of licenses actually available to the hunters. Other forms of
protest include activists' spreading deer repellent, sprinkling chopped
garlic cloves in water or lemon juice on trails to throw dogs off animal
scents, and leaving locks of human hair along trails to scare off deer.3 4
Also, activists enter the woods before the hunting season and play
loud radios or recordings of wolf howls, and walk with their dogs on
leashes, to teach young animals not yet experienced in being hunted to
scatter.3 5
Anti-hunting activists circulate petitions and write to local spon-
sors of hunts and the appropriate authorities urging them to cancel
the events, both for human and nonhuman animals' safety.36 They
write letters to the editors of local newspapers, alert local talk shows
about the debate, and post anti-hunting fliers in parks and other com-
munity areas. They urge their municipalities to pass ordinances ban-
ning the use of weapons within their limits, in the interest of public
safety. 37 They urge their congressional representatives-often via let-
ter-writing campaigns-to introduce bills prohibiting hunting and
trapping on national wildlife refuges and public lands.38 With the
help of sympathetic attorneys in organizations like the Animal Legal
Defense Fund,39 activists also file lawsuits to ban certain hunting in
particular areas." Additionally, they ask state governments to
appoint nonhunters to state fish and game departments and wildlife
committees.4
More recently, anti-hunting activists have organized demonstra-
tions to communicate their message to hunters as well as the public.
They design demonstrations with dramatic appeal to pierce the insen-
31. See R. BAKER, THE AMERICAN HUNTING MYTH 58 (1985).
32. See Dommer, supra note 30, at 70.




37. See R. BAKER, supra note 31, at 58-59.
38. Id. at 58.
39. The Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF"), formed in 1980, is a nationwide network
of over 300 attorneys dedicated to protecting and promoting animal rights, funded almost
entirely by individual, tax-deductible contributions. See Hentoff, Lawyers for Animals, Wash.
Post, Apr. 28, 1990, at CI, col. 1.
40. See Satchell, supra note 12, at 35.
41. See id. at 34.
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sitivity that society has conditioned individuals to accept.42 They pro-
test at the entrances of wildlife refuges and other hunting sites,
carrying signs and chanting. Protests at hunting sites are an espe-
cially effective method of communication because of their dramatic
media potential.43 The activists' direct protests in the fields and the
statutes prohibiting them from doing so, however, constitute the most
dramatic confrontations of the debate and implicate fundamental first
amendment principles.
B. The Hunters' Response to Anti-Hunting Protests
Hunters hunt for pleasure, relaxation, and sport. They defend
themselves from anti-hunting activists' claims that they are cruel to
animals by asserting that they are among the nation's great conserva-
tionists." They boast their $517 million contribution, generated by
hunting and fishing licenses, to state wildlife programs in 1989.11
Additionally, they argue that without hunters to thin the herds, ani-
mals would be too numerous for their habitat and thus face
starvation.46
Anti-hunting activists counter that hunters' arguments are disin-
genuous and misleading.47 Hunters' large contributions to state wild-
42. Anti-hunting advocate Ron Baker wrote:
Those who love Nature and detest the slaughter of wildlife in North America and
elsewhere must be prepared for a long and at times bitter and frustrating
struggle. It is customary for a society to establish a set of cultural traditions and
actively oppose attempts to modify and improve them. Throughout history,
unethical institutions have usually been reformed by a slow evolutionary process.
Reform movements have been, almost without exception, the products of a very
few enlightened individuals.
R. BAKER, supra note 31, at 247.
43. Doris Dixon, director of the Fund for Animals' 20,000-member Michigan branch,
stated: "An awful lot of people would like to [protest at hunting sites]. It seems that's about
the only way we can draw any public attention to what's going on." Peterson, supra note 9, at
12A, col. 1.
44. See Kasowski, Showdown on the Hunting Ground, OUTDOOR AMERICA, Winter 1986,
at 8-11, 33-34; Tapply, In Defense of Outdoorsmen, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 1989, at 10-11. But
see R. BAKER, supra note 31, at 32; Dommer, Who Pays the Tab for Wildlife Conservation?,
ANIMALS' VOICE MAG., Feb.-Mar. 1991, at 48.
45. New Twist in Animal Rights: Hunter Is the Prey, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1990, at A22,
col. 3. Although hunting and fishing licenses generate millions of dollars in yearly revenues,
there is another side to the story. See M. Fox, INHUMANE SOCIETY 114-16 (1990). For those
fees, hunting is permitted in 60% of United States wildlife refuges, and 45% of hunters are
allowed to kill on public taxpayer-supported lands. I. NEWKIRK, supra note 26, at 95.
Additionally, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service programs, which benefit hunters,
receive up to 90% of their funding from general tax revenues-not hunting fees. Id.
46. By reducing natural populations artificially every year, hunters actually stimulate





life programs do little more than ensure that wildlife and conservation
policies are designed to the hunters' advantage. 8 Hunter-dominated
boards and offices work to benefit a handful of game animals, rather
than the thousands of other species under the states' care.49
Hunters, a mere seven percent of the population, 50 feel
threatened by the force of the anti-hunting message and want to pro-
tect their privilege of hunting.5 Like the activists, the hunters engage
the media and traditional public relations methods to garner wide-
spread support for their hobby. For example, to secure favorable
media for hunting, the United Bowhunters of New Jersey periodically
holds press conferences at hunting sites with venison barbecues for
reporters.52 In another public relations effort, the United Bowhunters
gave away nearly a thousand pounds of venison to feed the homeless
last year.
5 3
The November 1990 issue of Bowhunter magazine warned
hunters not to wear face paint and camouflage in public because it
brings to mind paramilitary groups, violent movies, and armed
"kooks" in camouflage clothing. Consequently, when bowhunting
season opened in Maryland in September 1990, hunters wore suits
and ties in front of the television cameras and news photographers. 55
They set up information booths with educational pamphlets and
served doughnuts and coffee.
5 6
Despite the public-relations efforts, Hunters' most powerful
response to anti-hunting protesters to date has been the recent and
swift passage of hunter harassment statutes throughout the country. 
7
These statutes make it a crime to speak out against hunting."
Hunters, through organized lobbying efforts, have silenced anti-hunt-
ing activists in thirty-seven states.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF ANTI-HUNTING
PROTESTERS
The first amendment seemingly protects lawful protest activities
48. Id.
49. See R. BAKER, supra note 31; see also supra note 27.
50. Almost 16 million Americans purchased hunting licenses in 1989. Satchell, supra note
12, at 30.
51. See New Twist in Animal Rights: Hunter is the Prey, supra note 45, at A22, col. 2.
52. Id. at A22, col. 3.
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting BOWHUNTER, Nov. 1990, at 89).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 13.
58. Id.
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of anti-hunting groups in its provision that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech." 5 9 Despite this protection,
thirty-seven states have mandated restrictions on the conduct and
speech of anti-hunting protesters to enable hunters to engage in the
recreational taking of wildlife.60 Not surprisingly, the National Rifle
Association vigorously supports such legislation. 61  Hunter harass-
ment statutes effectively abridge freedom of speech and present a dan-
gerous license for jurisdictions that desire to squelch the vigor of the
hunting debate.
A. A History of Protest in First Amendment Doctrine
The Connecticut Act challenged in Dorman v. Satti and hunter
harassment statutes currently in place in a majority of states attempt
to eliminate effective anti-hunting protest. A historical review of pro-
tests and the first amendment establishes that the first amendment's
guarantee of free speech substantially protects protesters.
The United States Supreme Court has expanded the first amend-
ment right to protest since the early 1900's when it considered pro-
tests arising from labor disputes.62 Initially, because violence and
employer coercion often resulted from labor union pickets and pam-
phlet distributions, the Court considered pickets "unlawful conspira-
cies. '"63 The first amendment's assurance of free speech did not
protect the conduct of union employees."
The Court acknowledged first amendment protection of peaceful
protests in Thornhill v. Alabama.65 Mr. Thornhill participated in a
59. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The prohibition has been interpreted to apply to state
governments through the fourteenth amendment as well. See DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 364 (1937) (due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution
safeguards the freedoms of speech and press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
(freedom of speech and of press are personal rights and liberties protected by the fourteenth
amendment from impairment by the states).
60. See supra note 13.
61. See Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375, 377 n.l (D. Conn. 1988).
62. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Traders Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921)
(labor union "picket" considered "sinister"); cf Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U.S. 443 (1921) (labor union boycott considered damaging to the general public).
63. See Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (labor union
boycott involving picketing and distribution of printed materials held to be a restriction of
trade); see also Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (coercion of
employer through a strike held to be unlawful).
64. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 439. "[T]he agreement to act in concert when the signal is
published, gives the words 'Unfair,' 'We don't patronize,' or similar expressions, a force not
inhering in the words themselves, and therefore exceeding any possible right of speech which a
single individual might have." Id.
65. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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picket near his former employer's place of business66 and was con-
victed of violating an Alabama statute that forbade loitering or picket-
ing "about premises or [a] place of business."67 On appeal, Mr.
Thornhill argued that the statute deprived him of his first amendment
rights of assembly, speech, and petition for redress. 6  Because the
statute denied Mr. Thornhill and other protesters access to the most
effective means of educating the community about their views, the
Court held the statute unconstitutional. 69 The Court emphasized that
freedom of speech gives individuals the right to discuss public and
social issues70 in order for society to develop according to its changing
needs.7 Freedom of speech, it held, could be restricted only if it
threatened substantial harm to individuals, their property, or pri-
vacy.72 In so holding, Thornhill elevated the conduct associated with
"dissemination of information" to the status of a protected first
amendment freedom.7 a
Nine years later, the Court expanded the character of the public
protest protected under the first amendment. In Terminiello v. Chi-
cago,74 Mr. Terminiello made a controversial public speech resulting
in an angry protest that required local police control.75 The trial
court held Mr. Terminiello responsible for inciting the crowd and
66. Id. at 90. In Thornhill, six or eight striking labor union employees formed a picket line
and approached nonunion employees peacefully to persuade them not to go to work for Brown
Wood Preserving Co. Id. at 92, 94.
67. Id. at 91 (citing ALA. CODE § 3448 (1923)). The Supreme Court subsequently held the
statute "invalid on its face." Id. at 101.
68. Id. at 92-93.
69. Id. at 99-101.
70. Id. at 101-02; see also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (protest signs and
pamphlet distribution in front of the United States Supreme Court is a protected exercise of
first amendment rights); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (without evidence
of actual malice, a newspaper article containing defamatory remarks about a public official is a
protected exercise of free speech debate on public issue); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943)
(holding that distribution of Jehovah's Witnesses' pamphlets containing commercial
advertising is a protected exercise of first amendment rights despite violation of local
advertising ordinance); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (distribution of literature about
various political and religious issues in public places and at individual residences in four
different municipalities is a protected expression of ideas); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938) (distribution of Jehovah's Witnesses' materials, without the prior permission of city
officials, is a protected exercise of first amendment rights); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937) (public meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party is a protected exercise
of the first amendment right to assembly).
71. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 102.
72. Id. at 104-05.
73. Id. at 102-03; cf Note, Labor Law-Determination of Secondary Boycott Violations in
Common Situs Picketing During Area Standards Disputes, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1071 (1986)
(dissemination of information can be enjoined if it is a secondary boycott).
74. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
75. Id. at 2-3. Mr. Terminiello delivered a speech containing biased political and racial
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convicted him of disturbing the peace." On appeal, the Court
reversed his conviction, holding that speech does not lose its protected
status merely because it induces the public to unrest and dispute."
Because Mr. Terminiello had the right to express his opinions in a
public forum,7 the Court found that he could not be convicted of a
disturbance that resulted merely because others opposed his opin-
ions.79 The Court determined that without evidence of a clear and
present danger to the public,"' the right of expression in a public
forum cannot be limited or extinguished by censorship.8 '
Similarly, the civil rights protests of the 1960's precipitated emo-
tionally charged speech and conduct, highly offensive and disturbing
to observers. In Cox v. Louisiana,2 Reverend Cox, a civil rights
leader, led a demonstration involving approximately two thousand
black students.8 3  This demonstration was the students' attempt to
show their disapproval of segregation and the arrest of other black
students who had picketed stores with segregated lunch counters. 4
The students assembled and marched from the state capitol building
to the courthouse, where they sang, heard speeches, and recited the
Lord's Prayer and Pledge of Allegiance. 5 Reverend Cox's speech
content before a meeting of the Christian Veterans of America. To protest the defendant's
views, an angry crowd of about a thousand people gathered outside the meeting. Id. at 3.
76. Id. at 2. A Chicago city ordinance prohibited anyone from causing any "disturbance,"
"riot," or other "breach of the peace." Id. at 2 n.1 (citing Chicago, Ill. Code § 193-1 (1939)).
The Court held the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Terminiello. Id. at 5.
77. Id. at 4. The Court held:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.
Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance
of an idea. That is why freedom of speech ... is nevertheless protected against
censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present
danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest.
Id.
78. The traditional "public forum" includes streets and parks that "have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public . . . for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague v. Committee for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
79. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 5.
80. Id.; see also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
81. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4; see also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (holding
revocation of a permit to hold public worship meetings ridiculing other religions to be an
unlawful denial of first amendment rights).
82. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
83. Id. at 539.
84. Id. at 538-39.
85. Id. at 539-41.
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resulted in loud cheering and crying by some of the protestors.86 This
behavior agitated white observers, who began "muttering," "grum-
bling," and "jeering."" Police arrested Reverend Cox, who was later
convicted for disturbing the peace by inciting the crowd to respond
negatively to his speech. 8 On appeal, the Court reversed Reverend
Cox's conviction and determined that his conduct was a valid exercise
of his rights of free speech and assembly. 9 Relying on Terminiello,
the Court held that Reverand Cox did not forfeit his right to express
his views merely because of their aggravating nature. 90
As issues of public concern have become increasingly controver-
sial and the competition for media attention more fierce, protesters
have resorted to more dramatic, and sometimes unorthodox, means of
protest.91 Since Roe v. Wade,92 for instance, anti-abortion protesters'
tactics have included widespread demonstrations at abortion clinics,
sometimes involving criminal trespass. 93 Recently, protesters outside
the Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic stood in front of the clinic
driveway, carrying signs depicting gruesome pictures of aborted
fetuses, distributing anti-abortion literature, and giving unsolicited
counseling to women as they entered the clinic.94 The clinic sought
an injunction to prevent protesters from entering within a 500-foot
radius of the clinic and to prohibit protesters' usage of emotionally
charged terms such as "kill," "murder," and "butcher. ' 95 The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the injunction, refusing to
limit the place and manner of protesters' displays of public expression
86. Id. at 546.
87. Id. at 550.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 552.
90. Id. (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949)).
91. For protesters lacking the financial means to reach a wide audience, the potential for
media access offered by sensational protest tactics makes this type of conduct appealing.
Consider, for example, the high degree of media attention attracted by flag burning. Toner,
Spirit of 89: The Uproar over What America Owes Its First Allegiance to, N.Y. Times, July 2,
1989, at El, col. 1; Greenhouse, Justices, 5-4 Back Protesters' Right to Burn the Flag, N.Y.
Times, June 22, 1989, at Al, col. 5; cf. Pemberton, The Right ofAccess to Mass Media, in THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 276 (N. Dorsen ed. 1970). Mr. Pemberton suggests that the media
attention attracted by outrageous protest tactics may obscure the protestors' message and, in
the end, "provide no real solution to the problem of access to the media." Id. at 281.
92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Note, "Justified" Nuclear and Abortion
Clinic Protest. A Kantian Theory of Jurisprudence, 21 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 725 (1986). Anti-
abortion protesters' tactics have included proposing legislation, constitutional amendments,
picketing abortion clinics, and harassing women entering abortion clinics. See also Monaghan,
Sidewalk Counseling: A First Amendment Right, 31 CATH. LAW. 50 (1987); America's
Abortion Dilemma, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 1985, at 20, 23-24.
94. See Note, supra note 93, at 791.
95. Id. at 790.
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merely because of the unsettling effect of those displays on clinic
patients.96
Once again, in 1989 and 1990, the Court reiterated the first
amendment protection guaranteed to public protesters for speech on
matters of public concern by reversing convictions under two flag des-
ecration statutes.9 7 In Texas v. Johnson,98 the Court vindicated Greg-
ory Lee Johnson's right to publicly burn the national flag as an
effective and valid means of protesting the Reagan Administration's
policies.99 More important, in United States v. Eichman 100 the Court
not only reversed Eichman's conviction under the federal flag desecra-
tion statute,'0 but emphasized that regardless of majoritarian opposi-
tion to the protester's expression, the first amendment protected the
speaker's right to engage in symbolic speech.
0 2
Thus, the evolution of free speech protection for protests from
Thornhill to Eichman illustrates the substantial protection afforded to
protesters by the first amendment's assurance of free speech. Statutes
specifically prohibiting protesters from expressing their views against
employment practices, racial discrimination, abortion, governmental
policies, or war involvement would not pass constitutional muster
under first amendment doctrine. It is astonishing, in light of this
jurisprudence, that states have enacted statutes to prohibit protesters
from expressing their views against hunting.
B. The Connecticut Hunter Harassment Act: A Model
Section 53a-183a of the Connecticut Penal Code reads:
Harassment of hunters, trappers and fishermen: Class C
Misdemeanor
(a) No person shall: (1) Interfere with the lawful taking of
wildlife by another person, or acts in preparation for such taking,
96. Id. at 792. But see Frisby, 487 U.S. at 477, 483-85 (1988) (upholding, under the right
of privacy, a city ordinance prohibiting protesters from picketing outside the private home of a
physician who performed abortions while acknowledging anti-abortion protesters' rights to
march alone or in groups throughout neighborhoods); Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wash. 2d 212,
721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987) (holding that anti-abortion
protesters who obstructed sidewalks, engaged in face-to-face coercive counseling, distributed
anti-abortion literature, and screamed at women who refused to take the literature had abused
their right to freedom of speech).
97. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404
(1990).
98. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
99. Id. at 408-10.
100. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
101. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 700).
102. Eichman, I10 S. Ct. at 2409.
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with intent to prevent such taking; or (2) harass another person
who is engaged in the lawful taking of wildlife or acts in prepara-
tion for such taking.
(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section
shall be guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 103
The Connecticut Legislature enacted the Connecticut Act to
deter active opposition to hunting. o4 The Connecticut Act prohibits
any interference with hunting or acts in preparation for hunting, and
it prohibits harassment of a person hunting or preparing to hunt.
Because the Connecticut Act makes no attempt to define "interfere,"
"harass," and "acts in preparation for," these terms could be inter-
preted to proscribe a myriad of speech and conduct in contexts only
remotely related to hunting. The State Senate voted down a proposed
amendment to the Connecticut Act designed to clarify the "harass-
ment" subsection and to reduce the penalty of $500 or up to ninety
days in jail to an infraction with a fine of up to $99. 105 In addition to
its ambiguity and severe penalty, the Connecticut Act cuts off anti-
hunting protesters' access to their most forceful medium of communi-
cation, demonstrations at hunting grounds.
Thirty-seven states have enacted legislation similar to the Con-
necticut Act.10 6 Not surprising, the National Rifle Association has
lobbied staunchly and silently to support hunter harassment stat-
103. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183a (West Supp. 1990). Violation of this statute, a
class C misdemeanor, subjects an offender to a fine and/or imprisonment for up to three
months. Id. §§ 53a-28, 53a-36(3).
104. Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375, 377 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989). One of the Hunter Harassment Act's supporters stated
during floor debate: "[W]e need to have some sort of deterrent.... [T]here have been some
instances where hunters' lives have been threatened by individuals clearly because of the
emotional type of objection that there is to... taking of animals' lives." Id. at 377 n.2 (citing
28 CONN. S. PROC., 1985 Sess., pt. 10, at 3328-29) (statement of Sen. Benson). Another of the
bill's supporters argued that "hunters are picked on often.... [They] should have the right to
hunt in lands that are made available to them." Id. (citing CONN. S. PROC., 1985 Sess., pt. 10,
at 3332) (statement of Sen. Eaton).
An advocate of the bill explained during the debate that "the people who are involved in
this business of harassment are very apparent in their harassment.., and they do it [purposely
and] habitually and repeatedly." Id. at 377 n.2 (citing 28 CONN. S. PROC.,1985 Sess., pt. 10, at
3325-34) (statement of Sen. Gunther). Senator Benson, pushing for the bill, further noted
"that examples of hunter 'harassment' would include '... intentionally blaring a radio when
someone intended to go out and pursue game,' giving 'verbal abuse to someone who was
preparing to go out into some public property perhaps to take game,' and 'spreading human
hair around the facility [so that] game would be deterred.' " Id. at 377 (citing 28 CONN. S.
PROC., 1985 Sess., pt. 10, at 3327) (statement of Sen. Benson).
105. Dorman, 678 F. Supp. at 377 (citing 28 CONN. S. PROC., 1985 Sess., pt. 10, at 3325-
34).
106. See supra note 13.
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utes. ' 7 The effect of every hunter harassment statute is the same:
suppression of the free speech rights of anti-hunting activists.
Thus far, wherever hunter harassment statutes have been chal-
lenged, courts have held the laws unconstitutional. For example, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled in a 1986 advisory opinion that
a proposed bill prohibiting harassment of hunters, trappers, and fish-
ermen was facially unconstitutional,10 8 in violation of the right of free
speech guaranteed by the New Hampshire Constitutution.'0 9 Like-
wise, in Dorman v. Satti,10 the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit struck down the Connecticut Act on free speech grounds.
C. Dorman v. Satti: When Activists Take Their Case
into the Field
Ducks, geese, and other waterfowl visit a marshland each fall
and winter in a state forest in Niantic, Connecticut. 1' For several
years, hunters also have been among the visitors. Francelle Dorman,
who lives next to the forest, observed hunters dragging dead birds
along the road, leaving blood on the snow."12 Although not an animal
rights activist, Ms. Dorman was fond of Canadian geese and other
wildlife, whose appearance she welcomed each season and whose
numbers she saw diminish each year. 13 One winter day late in the
hunting season, she walked out to the marsh to talk to the hunters.
She told the hunters that they mutilated more waterfowl than they
killed and abandoned them to lingering deaths." 4 She spoke to them
about "the violence and cruelty of hunting, of the beauty of the water-
fowl and of their right to live peacefully and without harm."''" 5 When
107. See Dorman, 678 F. Supp. at 377 n.l.
108. Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 46, 509 A.2d 749 (1986).
109. N.H. CONST., pt. I, art. XXII.
110. 678 F. Supp. at 375.
111. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
112. Bass, Law Shielding Hunters Put to the Test, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1986, at 11C, col. 1.
113. In her affidavit, Ms. Dorman states that she is "morally opposed to the hunting and
senseless killing of harmless and defenseless animals, including all waterfowl." Dorman, 678
F. Supp. at 377-78.
114. Bass, supra note 111, at I1C, col. 1.
115. Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 862 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989). As Ms. Dorman recounted,
I said to [the hunters], 'Why is it you can't admit that you get a thrill out of
killing' but they didn't say too much .... They were kind of disgusted with my
views.
... Then I said to them, 'You wound and mutilate more than you kill, and
leave the geese to die a terrible death.' One of the hunters had a beautiful dog
and I asked him, 'Suppose someone shot your dog? Wouldn't you be outraged?'
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Ms. Dorman continued speaking her mind, the hunters told her she
was breaking the law, and if she did not stop, they would have her
arrested.116 Ms. Dorman refused to leave the marsh, and the hunters
summoned a police officer."' The officer twisted Ms. Dorman's
hands behind her back and arrested her for violating the Connecticut
Act."'8 Although the prosecution ultimately dismissed the charges
against Ms. Dorman," 9 she sought a declaration of the Connecticut
Act's constitutionality in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Connecticut.12
0
The District Court declared the Connecticut Act unconstitution-
ally overbroad, 12 1 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed in Dorman v. Satti,122 an opinion providing
momentum for the free speech rights of anti-hunting protesters. The
United States Supreme Court refused to hear the case. 123 Without the
Supreme Court's pronouncement, the Second Circuit's analysis pro-
vides a useful framework for evaluating the constitutionality of hunter
harassment statutes.
... Basically, I tried to reason with them. I didn't yell or raise my voice.
We had a few strong words but no cursing.
Bass, supra note 111, at 1 IC, col. 1. The hunters characterized the exchange differently.
Roger Hurley, one of the hunters with whom Ms. Dorman spoke, states: " '[S]he laid into us
about hunting and killing wildlife. She made it clear that she was going to stay there and not
let us hunt. She was relentless.' " Id. at I1 C, col. 1. "We were very polite to her and took
turns talking to her, but we weren't out there to talk.... We wanted to hunt." Id. at 1 lC, col.
1.
116. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Ms. Dorman agreed initially to "rehabilitation" in lieu of pleading guilty because she
had no money to hire a lawyer. Then she met William Manetti, President of the New Haven,
Connecticut-based Animal Rights Front, who introduced her to an attorney willing to take her
case, James Auwood. See Bass, supra note 111, at 1 C, col. 1. Mr. Mannetti summarized his
concerns with the Connecticut Act:
[The law] says that the moment the hunter leaves the door, the wildlife belongs
to him. If he feels anyone is trying in any way to interfere with the taking of his
game, then he can call the police.... Our fear is that this is the beginning of a
roaring wave of singling out special-interest groups and giving them legal
privileges that the rest of us don't have. These groups with the most political
clout will get these privileges, and that's pretty scary.
Id. When Mr. Auwood took Ms. Dorman's case, he identified the Connecticut Act's ambigu-
ity in its use of the word "interference." He stated: "If I refuse to sell you bullets, or if I'm
driving a car with someone who is going hunting and we get into an accident, I could be
arrested under this law.... It's ridiculous." Id.
120. Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375 (D. Conn.), 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
121. Id. at 383.
122. 862 F.2d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
123. Satti v. Dorman, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989) (denying certiorari).
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1. CONTENT-NEUTRAL AND CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS
A majority of the Supreme Court never has interpreted the con-
stitutional guarantee of free speech as absolute. 2 4 The closest the
Court has come to vindicating an absolutist approach to free speech is
in its treatment of restrictions that regulate speech because of its con-
tent. 25  Such "content-based" restrictions threaten first amendment
values because they limit expression of a particular viewpoint and
skew the "marketplace of ideas."' 26 Because of their danger to free
speech, the Court subjects content-based restrictions to heightened
scrutiny. 127 If a state wishes to regulate speech based on its content, it
must show that the regulation serves a compelling state interest and is
drawn narrowly to achieve that interest.
128
The Court has developed a different doctrinal approach for regu-
lations it identifies as "content-neutral," or regulation on the non-
communicative aspect of speech. 129 A restriction is content-neutral if
it applies impartially to all viewpoints. 130 Content-neutral regulations
124. The Supreme Court has stated that "The First Amendment does not guarantee the
right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any manner that may be
desired." Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647
(1981). But see Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing that constitutional guarantee of free speech is absolute).
125. See M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 87-126 (1984);
see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-2, 12-3, at 789-804 (2d ed. 1988)
(delineating two categories of governmental restrictions on speech).
126. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); see also Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 198-223 (1983) (arguing that even modest
content-based restrictions skew public debate).
127. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); cf United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968).
128. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397; cf. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367.
129. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 125, § 12-2, at 791-94.
130. See Heifron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649
(1981). Content-neutral restrictions limit expression without regard to the content of the
message conveyed. Laws that prohibit noisy speeches near a hospital, ban billboards in
residential communities, or restrict the distribution of leaflets in public places are examples of
content-neutral restrictions. Content-based restrictions, on the other hand, limit expression
because of the specific message conveyed. Laws that prohibit seditious libel, ban the
publication of confidential information, or restrict speeches that may trigger a hostile audience
response are examples of this type of restriction. Content-based restrictions are especially
problematic under the first amendment, as laws that restrict only some messages and not
others are especially likely to distort the substantive content of public debate and to mutilate
the thought processes of the community. Hunter harassment statutes are a primary example
of content-based restrictions because they arbitrarily limit the hunting debate by silencing the
anti-hunting voices. Thus, unlike content-neutral restrictions, which are generally subject to a
form of ad hoc balancing, content-based laws are presumptively invalid. For a more thorough
discussion of the content-based/content-neutral distinction, see Stone, Content Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987) [hereinafter Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions];




require lower scrutiny than content-based restrictions and are more
easily justified.' 3  Unlike content-based regulations, which are pre-
sumptively invalid, content-neutral regulations are subject to a form
of ad hoc balancing.
1 32
Government frequently seeks to categorize restrictions on speech
as content neutral, referring to some danger beyond the speech itself,
or calling the restriction a "time, place, or manner" regulation.
131 If
the state wishes instead to regulate the time, place, or manner of
expression in a content-neutral way, then it may do so as long as the
restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant state interest
and leave open alternative channels of communication.1 34 For exam-
ple, if the state wants to restrict the time, place, or manner of expres-
sion in a public place, it may do so if it does not regulate based on the
content of speech, and applies its regulations even-handedly to all
speech.
In Dorman v. Satti, 35 the State attempted to defend the Connect-
icut Act as a valid, content-neutral regulation. The State argued that
although the Connecticut Act might have had some incidental effect
on speech, it primarily regulated conduct on public hunting lands.1
36
The Second Circuit, however, rejected this justification, stating that
the Connecticut Act's prohibition of "interference" and "harassment"
regulated a substantial amount of speech, as well as conduct incident
to speech, and thus could not be upheld as a content-neutral time,
place, or manner regulation.
37
Despite the Second Circuit's recognition that the Connecticut
Act regulated speech on the basis of content, proponents of hunter
harassment laws and numerous state legislatures disagree. 38  They
continue to characterize hunter harassment laws as time, place, and
131. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367.
132. Id.; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 125, § 12-2, at 791-94.
133. See L. TRIBE, supro note 125, § 12-3, at 794; see also Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (rejecting government's attempt to characterize a restriction
forbidding the wearing of armbands in school to protest the Vietnam war as a "place"
regulation, referring to the danger of school disruption); O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367.
134. See Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, supra note 130.
135. 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
136. Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 862 F.2d 432 (2d. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989). Safety concerns alone might justify a conduct regulation.
Id. at 379. The State argued that the Connecticut Act simply regulated conduct that
prevented hunters from hunting. But anti-hunting protesters are far more likely to use speech
to dissuade armed hunters from hunting rather than physical conduct. The Connecticut Act
thus proscribes speech, eroding the speech/conduct distinction attempted by the State.
137. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 437.
138. See supra note 13.
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manner restrictions, incidental to speech. 39 The Supreme Court has
upheld time, place, and manner restrictions if (a) they are content-
neutral, (b) they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
mental interest, and (c) ample alternative means of communication
are available. 40
Hunter harassment statutes, like the Connecticut Act, do not
meet any of these tests. As the Second Circuit stated, the Connecticut
Act regulated speech as well as conduct, and regulated that speech on
the basis of viewpoint. 141 Ms. Dorman's conduct and expression con-
sisted of walking and talking. 142 Insofar as her conduct-following
the hunters through the woods-was incidental to her speech, and she
undertook it only to permit her speech to the hunters, punishment of
that conduct has both the purpose and effect of punishing the "fact of
communication."1 43 Indeed, had Ms. Dorman been espousing the
glories of the hunt, or following the hunter while carrying a weapon
with which to kill deer, she would not have been arrested even if she
had "distracted" the hunters with her conversation and "interfered"
with the hunt by making too much noise as she walked. Thus, Ms.
Dorman's arrest, based upon the facts construed most favorably to
the State, is an exercise of police power that the Constitution forbids,
because it "effectively empower[s] a majority to silence dissidents sim-
ply as a matter of personal predilections." ' 44
Most of the state hunter harassment laws are not narrowly tai-
lored, 1 45 as their sweeping language reaches a wide range of activities
not confined to any particular time, place, or manner.' 46 Proponents
139. Dorman, 678 F. Supp. at 379.
140. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1986); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). For examples of content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions the Court has upheld, see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288 (1984) (National Park Service regulation prohibiting people from sleeping in the
park); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1983) (rule
allowing solicitors at a state fair to sell or distribute merchandise only from a duly licensed
location); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (local ordinance forbidding
disturbing noises near a school in session); and Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
(local ordinance forbidding street parades without a license).
141. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 437.
142. Dorman, 678 F. Supp. at 377-78.
143. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971).
144. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S.
at 21).
145. But see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 61, 301, § L.b (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (limiting
regulations on protesters' conduct during hunters' preparatory acts to those "which occur on
lands or waters upon which the affected person has the right or privilege to take such
wildlife").




of hunter harassment laws may argue that anti-hunting protesters
have alternative means of communication, yet such alternatives
hardly allow free speech when they are not the speakers' most effec-
tive forum for speech. 47 Demonstrations at hunting sites generate
media attention and reach a broad audience, making them the most
effective fora to advance the hunting debate.
In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,4 ' Justice
Roberts recognized that the right to communicate in the streets and
parks "is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordi-
nation to the general comfort and convenience."' 49 The competing
interests between first amendment freedom of speech and the need to
maintain public order create tension.15 0 On the one hand, preserva-
tion of order by use of licensing systems or permits can inhibit speech.
On the other hand, if the government may not regulate the use of its
streets and parks, danger of disorder exists.
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley 5' illustrates a contempo-
rary time, place, and manner analysis that seeks to balance these com-
peting interests. Earl Mosley picketed a Chicago high school for
seven months to protest racial discrimination. 152 In response, the city
council passed an ordinance prohibiting all but peaceful labor picket-
ing near the school. 153 Addressing Mosley's suit challenging the con-
stitutionality of the ordinance, the Supreme Court held that the
ordinance violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because it distinguished labor picketing from other types
147. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (striking down a statute that denied
protesters access to the most effective means of communicating their message to the
community).
148. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). The plurality opinion in Hague has been regarded as the Court's
authoritative ruling. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.01, at 4-4 (1984).
149. 307 U.S. at 516 (Roberts, J., concurring). Hague generated two disparate lines of
cases. See M. NIMMER, supra note 148, § 4.09, at 4-70.
150. The tension between freedom of speech and maintenance of order has been described
as:
The rights of the speaker to communicate, and of the public to know, [which]
coalesce to demand stringent judicial protection for the use of the local forum.
At the very least, the parks and streets of the local community cannot be
excluded from the marketplace of ideas ....
On the other hand, there is no question that government has vital interests
in maintaining order in the local forum. Law enforcement officials cannot be
expected to stand idly by in the face of a threat to life and property, even though
expression may be involved.
J. BARRON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS 64 (1979).
151. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
152. Id. at 93.
153. Id.
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of picketing,I54 and that violated freedom of speech under the first
amendment because it failed the time, place, and manner test.1I" Not-
ing that time, place, and manner restrictions on picketing are permis-
sible to protect important governmental interests, 56 the Court held
this ordinance unconstitutional because it prohibited picketing based
on the content of the message. 57 The ordinance "describe[d] permis-
sible picketing in terms of its subject matter,"'5 8 and "government
may not grant use of a forum to people whose views it finds accepta-
ble, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views."' 5 9 Thus, Mosley teaches that a state may not
disguise content control in a time, place, and manner restriction.' 6°
The Second Circuit identified the same problem in the Connecticut
Act in Dorman v. Satti, and it is one reason why the court held the
Connecticut Act unconstitutional.'
61
2. VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH
"[A] penal statute ...must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render
them liable to its penalties."'' 62 Courts use two approaches to deter-
mine whether a penal statute is unconstitutionally vague. One
approach utilizes the due process requirement that "persons of ordi-
nary intelligence and experience be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited, so that they may govern their behavior
accordingly. 63 The second approach allows a court to declare a stat-
154. Id. at 94-95. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids the
states from denying any person the equal protection of the law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
155. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94.
156. Id. at 98.
157. Id. at 99.
158. Id. at 95.
159. Id. at 96.
160. Id. The Court stated that "the essence of... forbidden censorship is content control."
Id.
161. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
162. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). In Connally, the
Court stated that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Id.; see also Hynes v. Mayor
of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 553 (1975);
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n.8 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108 (1972); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1964); United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1948); and Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). See generally Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
163. Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 118, 389 A.2d 341, 345 (1978); see also Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S at 108 (1972).
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ute unconstitutional on vagueness grounds "if it fails to provide
legally fixed standards and adequate guidelines for police, judicial
officers, triers of fact and others whose obligation it is to enforce,
apply and administer the penal laws.""'
The Second Circuit held unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad'65 the Connecticut Act's provisions that no person shall "inter-
fere with" or "harass" persons engaged in hunting or "acts in
preparation" for hunting. 66 It rejected the State's argument that the
Connecticut Act could be saved by a limiting construction by the
Connecticut Supreme Court. The Second Circuit relied on Houston v.
Hill,67 where the Supreme Court refused to allow a limiting construc-
tion in order to save an overbroad Houston, Texas ordinance. 68 The
words "interfere," "harass" and "acts in preparation of" did not
allow a limiting construction, according to the Second Circuit,
because "[t]hey can mean anything."1 69 Most states' hunter harass-
ment statutes contain the same ambiguous terms. 70
a. Vagueness
A hunter harassment statute is void for vagueness unless it is
"sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what con-
duct on their part will render them liable to its penalties."' 71 The
Connecticut Act could be read to prohibit any speech in the presence
of a hunter if the hunter believed that the speech interfered with his
164. Bowers, 283 Md. at 118, 389 A.2d at 345. The Court in Grayned stated that "[a] vague
law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution
on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application." 408 U.S. at 108-09; see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
170 (1972).
165. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
166. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183a (West 1990).
167. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
168. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 435 (citing Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987)). In Hill, the
Supreme Court struck down a municipal ordinance making it unlawful to "interrupt" a police
officer on duty. Hill, 482 U.S. at 455. The Court found the ordinance unconstitutionally
overbroad under the first amendment. Id. at 461. The ordinance provided: "It shall be
unlawful for any person to assault, strike or in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt
any policeman in the execution of his duty, or any person summoned to aid in making an
arrest." HOUSTON, TEX., MUN. CODE § 34-1 l(a) (1984). Due to Texas pre-emption statutes,
the Court determined that "the enforceable portion of the ordinance makes it 'unlawful for any
person to... in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution
of his duty' and thereby prohibits verbal interruptions of police officers." Hill, 482 U.S. at 461.
169. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 436.
170. See, e.g., MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 10-422 (Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:648.1. to .3 (West 1987); cf N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-295 (1987) (drawing more narrow
restrictions upon protesters' conduct).
171. See supra note 162.
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hunting or harassed him.'72 The Act's undefined terminology does
not meet the due process requirement that "persons of ordinary intel-
ligence and experience be afforded a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that they may govern their behavior accord-
ingly." '173 A conversation in a supermarket checkout line denouncing
hunting could constitute a violation of the law under the language of
the Act depending on the content of the speech and the listener's
reaction.
A hunter harassment statute also may be void for vagueness
because it fails "to provide legally fixed standards and adequate guide-
lines for police, judicial officers, triers of fact and others whose obliga-
tion it is to enforce, apply and administer penal laws."' 74 Ms.
Dorman was the victim of a police arrest. Because the statute lacked
adequate guidelines, prosecutors later determined her arrest to be
"premature."' 175 Police and prosecutors could interpret a whole range
of activities as violating the Connecticut Act, or hunter harassment
statutes using similar language.
b. Overbreadth
Most hunter harassment laws are unconstitutionally overbroad
in addition to being void for vagueness.176 A law is overbroad if it
does not aim specifically at "evils within the allowable area of [gov-
ernmental] control, but ... sweeps within its ambit other activities"
172. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
173. Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 118, 389 A.2d 341, 345 (1978); see also Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
In determining the facial constitutionality of statutes that have not been limited by
judicial construction, the Court has utilized the dictionary definition of words in the statute.
See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972) (relying upon WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961)). If a court used the dictionary definition of the words
within the Connecticut Act to delimit protesters' conduct, "interfere" would mean "to come in
collision; to be in opposition; to run at crosspurposes ... to enter into or take part in the
concerns of others." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1118 (1976).
"Harass" would mean "to worry... to tire out, as with physical or mental effort; ... to vex,
trouble, or annoy continually or chronically." Id. at 1031. Acts of "interfering" and
"harassing" are prohibited not only when directed toward an individual in the act of taking
wildlife, but also when they affect an individual engaged in any "acts in preparation" for such
taking. "Preparation," as used in this context, is defined as "[t]he action or process of getting
ready for some occasion, test, or duty ... a preliminary measure or plan." Id. at 1790.
174. Bowers, 283 Md. at 118, 389 A.2d at 345. The Court in Grayned stated that "[a] vague
law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution
on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application." 408 U.S. at 108-09; see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
170 (1972).
175. Dorman, 678 F. Supp. at 378.
176. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (holding a restriction
unconstitutionally overbroad despite its unambiguous requirements).
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that are constitutionally protected. I77 Certainly the government is
entitled to control conduct on public hunting lands. Hunter harass-
ment statutes like the Connecticut Act, however, reach far beyond
regulating conduct on hunting grounds. Their broad sweep criminal-
izes a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activities,
including: playing a radio, playing a tape recording of anti-hunting
sentiments, speaking with a voice amplifier, hiking with noisy equip-
ment, singing, praying, picnicking, passing out leaflets, bird watching,
photographing wildlife, reading aloud, and silently standing vigil.
In addition to being overbroad and vague, hunter harassment
laws are superfluous. A hunter, whether on state or federal public
land, is already protected from misconduct at demonstrations, as any
other citizen would be protected. Violators of laws against trespass,
vandalism, public nuisance, reckless endangerment, general harass-
ment, and disturbing the peace are subject to arrest.
IV. CONCLUSION
Kindness to animals has been said to be a mark of civilized socie-
ties. 178 Only in the past few years have the ethics of that philosophy
been extended to all animals, not just house cats and warm puppies. 
179
We are now in the stage of social protest, where civil disobedience,
demonstrations, and lobbying raise public awareness of the rights of
nonhuman animals, of which hunting is but one area of concern. 8 '
The activist seeks to raise consciousness of the hunting issue and to
appeal to a sense of justice in others. This is best accomplished
through public demonstrations and subsequent reports in the mass
media, which increase political pressure on decisionmakers.
177. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 90 (1940).
178. "The test of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by the way its animals are
treated." Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, quoted in THE EXTENDED CIRCLE: A
COMMONPLACE BOOK OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 91 (Wynne-Tyson ed. 1989).
179. See Allen, supra note 9; Goodkin, supra note 9; see also P. SINGER, supra note 9
(widely credited with first articulating a comprehensive philosophy that embraces the rights of
animals).
180. Questioning the very need for hunting, one commentator wrote:
In examining hunting ... we must ask and answer two basic questions: Are
such activities necesary and, do they promote the concept of "being dignity"?
The answer to the first is obvious: hunting and trapping are both relics of earlier
ages when humans depended on hunted meat for food, and trapped skins for
clothing. The answer to the second question is equally obvious: a system that
promotes the unnecessary and agonizing slaughter of countless millions of
powerless sentient beings cannot promote the concept of "being dignity" as we
have defined it, i.e., the right to a share in the values of respect, well-being, and
affection.
Allen, supra note 9, at 389 (citations omitted).
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For some, killing animals with steel-tipped arrows is a sport; they
call these animals "game." For these individuals, killing is a great
way to spend a crisp fall afternoon in one of the wildlife areas around
the country. For others, hunting-the stalking and killing of animals
for recreation-is cruel under any circumstances, but particularly
when hunters use bows and arrows, because half the animals hit with
arrows are not killed, but die slowly of wounds and infections."' 1 Yet
at this time, licensed hunting is legal in this country. Ironically, many
forms of speech opposing hunting are illegal in two-thirds of the coun-
try, and Congress is considering legislation to proscribe protest
against hunting on federal lands.1 82 Hunter harassment laws allow
police to arrest a person for quietly asking a hunter not to kill a deer.
In Connecticut, police arrested Francelle Dorman on state forest
property, open to the public, for talking to goose hunters and attempt-
ing to dissuade them from killing the waterfowl.18 3 Although the Sec-
ond Circuit declared the Connecticut Act unconstitutional, hunter
harassment laws in other states remain intact. 84 Recently, two sepa-
rate groups of animal rights advocates were arrested and prosecuted
in Maryland for talking politely to hunters and rustling the leaves
beneath their feet as they walked.' 85
The first amendment protects speech. A state may prohibit
speech for its content only when the state's interest is compelling. As
the Second Circuit held in Dorman v. Satti, no compelling interest
supports the state's desire to protect hunters from speech they would
rather not hear.'86 Just as the Connecticut Act failed under constitu-
tional scrutiny, so should similar hunter harassment laws in other
states. Further, Congress should not compound the states' errors by
enacting a federal content-based counterpart.
181. The crossbows currently used by hunters pack an average 1,500 pounds of pressure.
According to the Texas Wildlife Commission, bowhunters report a 50% or higher wounding
rate. Hunters shoot 21 arrows.for each deer killed. Shot placement is random, and it is hard
to hit vital organs; experienced bowhunters injure more deer than novice bowhunters, who
most often miss completely. See Pascelle, supra note 29, at 15-18.
182. For a compilation of the state hunter harassment laws, see supra note 13. Congress is
currently considering a federal hunter harassment counterpart. See H.R. 3768, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989).
183. Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
184. See supra note 13.
185. Heidi Prescott, a 28 year-old from Gaithersburg, Maryland, refused on principle to
pay her $500 fine and was handcuffed, strip-searched, and sent to jail for 15 days. Due to
Maryland's overly broad and vague hunter harassment statute, Prescott may be one of very
few people in United States history jailed for trying to prevent violence. Jennings, 'Harassing'
Hunters Lands Activist in Jail; Animals Rights Backer Says She Was Exercising Freedom to
Speak, Wash. Post, July 26, 1990, at DI, col. 1.
186. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
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To argue that content-based restrictions cannot withstand consti-
tutional scrutiny, however, does not mean that the state is powerless
to protect the hunter's interest in harassment-free hunting. It simply
means that the state is limited in its approach. Anti-hunting activists
have the right to attempt to persuade hunters that killing wildlife is
wrong. Their most effective forum is the hunting site. This is the
forum in which the activist can have the greatest effect, both on the
hunter and on the hunting debate, by linking speech about animal
rights to the place where they are killed. At the same time, however,
one must acknowledge that safety concerns and the hunter's privilege
under state law to hunt wildlife may necessitate some regulation of
the nonhunter at that forum. For this reason, this Comment has not
argued that the state may never regulate or restrict animal rights
activists' conduct. Instead, it urges states to adopt regulations that
seek to accommodate all of these competing interests, rather than just
some of them.
Narrowly drawn time, place, and manner restrictions, coupled
with vigorous prosecution of acts of vandalism and protest that
become physically violent, would accommodate the competing inter-
ests. In drafting statutes, states should leave ample room both for on-
and off-site protest. A state, for example, could limit the activist at
the site to silent sign-carrying protest. This would ensure the pro-
tester's safety while protecting the hunter's interest in not having the
animals scared away. Off-site regulation, however, should be much
less restricted because it implicates neither the safety interest nor the
concern in scaring away the kill. Unless the states make genuine
efforts to allow ample means of effective communication, persons like
Francelle Dorman must continue to press their free speech interests.
The Supreme Court should accept its next opportunity to define
clearly the particular situations where content-based restrictions may
be perimissible to protect hunters and give ample breathing space to
speech on matters of public concern. Until then, the hunting debate
remains critically injured in over three-fourths of the country.
AILEEN M. UGALDE
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